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ARTICLES
MISPRISION OF ANTITRUST FELONY
ROBERT J. HOERNER*
I. PROLOGUE
HE FOLLOWING COLLOQUY TOOK PLACE on April 7, 1978, at the spring
meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association,
between Miles Kirkpatrick, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and John Shenefield, then Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice:
MR. KIRKPATRICK: Yes, there is a thorny question that many
of us, in one way or another, have faced. It arises out of the fact
that the Sherman Act offenses are now felonies. Therefore, the
misprision of felony statute applies.' Has the Division developed
any policy on this?
Let us assume that a company finds that its sales manager
has been engaged in some hard core price fixing. It is arguable
that under the misprision statute the company has two choices
and two choices alone without grave risk of becoming involved
in a misprision. One is to leave the guy exactly where he is, con-
tinue to pay him exactly what he is paid and treat him no dif-
ferently than if it had not been discovered. The other is to fire
him out of hand. To do anything less than firing him out of hand,
to demote him, to keep him on the payroll, to retire him early,
could well be interpreted as keeping him on a string, and as such
it might be an affirmative . . . [act of] . . . concealment which
would trigger the statute. Has the Division any policy on that?
MR. SHENEFIELD: No. This is an area that is recently receiving
attention. The Division has no special wisdom on it. In fact, the
Antitrust Section of the Bar Association could well devote some
attention to this, because it is something with which individual
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D., Univ. of
Michigan; Chief, Evaluation Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,
1963-65. The views expressed herein are those of the author. Copyright 1980 by
Robert J. Hoerner.
118 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon
as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil
or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more
than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
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counsel have to come to grips very late at night in rooms full of
documents. The question of whether a delay in doing any of
these things can be interpreted as affirmative action is also un-
answered.
The Lancey case,2 the main precedent construing that statute,
does require an affirmative act, in spite of the language of the
statute. So, perhaps there is some slight room for movement
there. But it seems to me that the lawyer is left in an impossible
position and a very uncomfortable one. The Division has no
special wisdom or advice to lawyers on their efforts in this area,
as opposed to some others. I think it ought to get some atten-
tion.
We clearly have no guidelines or policy.'
The purpose of this article is to give the misprision area some
preliminary attention in order to make the lawyer's position a little less
impossible and a little more comfortable.
II. THE BROADER PROBLEM
When an attorney discovers clear evidence that his corporate client
has committed an antitrust felony, he and his client are immediately
confronted with an interrelated tangle of extraordinarily difficult ques-
tions:
-To what extent will the attorney's communications with the
client about the violation be subject to the attorney-client
privilege?'
-In this context, who is deemed the "client," the entity or the
individual?5
' Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922
(1966).
' Panel Discussion Interview with John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 775, 794-95 (1978) (emphasis
added).
' See Miller, The Corporate A ttorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product
Doctrine: Protection from Compelled Disclosure in Criminal Investigation of a
Corporation, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 569 (1978); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege,
the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 699 (1979). See also Note, Corporations-Attorney
Client Privilege, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413 (1979).
1 The question of whether the identity of the corporate client is determined
by the "control group" test or the "subject matter" test will presumably be de-
cided in United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 1310 (1980). See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, I
503(b)[041 (1979). Is the attorney also representing, or should he arrange to repre-
sent, the individual corporate employees whom he is interviewing or may inter-
view? If so, what is his duty to them, especially if they are in a position con-
flicting with the attorney's corporate client? See Favretto, "The Perils of Multi-
[Vol. 28:529
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-If the attorney has been acting, to some extent at least, as an
investigator, will the report of his findings be privileged?6
- What is the attorney's duty and the client's duty of disclosure
to the client's auditors?
7
-What, if any, is the attorney's duty of disclosure to the
Securities and Exchange Commission;' what is the client's duty
of disclosure to the Commission;' and what is the potential
ple Representation in Criminal Antitrust Proceedings," Remarks at Chicago Bar
Assn.'s Spring Antitrust Symposium (May 3, 1977); Kennedy, Special Problems in
Representing the Individual Defendant, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 667, 668-69 (1978).
Finally, does the corporate client include its shareholders? See Garner v. Wolfin-
barger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
6 See Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the
Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative
Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5 (1979). See also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 6.2 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
, ABA CORPORATE BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW SECTION, AUDITOR'S LETTER
HANDBOOK (1976); Note, Attorney Responses to Audit Letters: The Problem of
Disclosing Loss Contingencies Arising from Litigation and Unasserted Claims,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 838 (1976); Note, The Scope of Attorneys' Responses to
Auditors'Requests for Information- The ABA and AICPA Compromise, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. 783 (1976).
8 The contours of an attorney's general duty of disclosure, if any, under the
federal securities laws are uncertain at present. See generally Lipman, The
SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(1974); Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An
Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the
Duties and Civil Liberties of Attorneys under the Federal Securities Statutes,
34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
taken the position in litigation that in certain circumstances an attorney has the
duty to ensure public disclosure of material financial information concerning his
client notwithstanding the traditional obligation of confidentiality. See, e.g.,
S.E.C. v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C., complaint filed Feb. 3, 1972) [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977) (stipula-
tion of settlement and order). See also KLEIN, THE SEC AND THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION: MATERIAL ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS, ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION, 597 (PLI 1979). The SEC recently rejected a rulemaking
petition which would have required disclosure of the nature of the relationship
between reporting companies and their outside counsel with respect to reporting
on probable law violations. 44 Fed. Reg. 44,881 (1979), comments summarized in
532 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 12, 1979), rejection announced in 552
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) H-1 (May 7, 1980). It nevertheless seems likely that
the principles governing this area will undergo significant revision in the near
future. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1.13(b) (Discussion
Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), Kramer, Client's Frauds and their Lawyer's Obligations: A
Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979).
, Under traditional principles, the question whether public disclosure of il-
legal or possibly illegal conduct is required is based, in the first instance, upon a
qualitative economic analysis, ie., emphasis is to be placed upon the effect of an
19791
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liability of each under Rule 10b-5'0 for nondisclosure of a viola-
tion?"
item of information on the corporation's profit and loss account and on the earn-
ings trends which determine modern ratios. See Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and
"Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1971). The second component of
the traditional analysis is based upon a quantitative analysis, i.e., the relative im-
portance of a particular fact or group of facts must be assessed to determine if it
is important enough to require public disclosure. See, e.g., Instruction 2 to Item 5
of Regulation S-K, [1979] 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,963 (excluding from
disclosure requirement claims for damages if the amount involved is less than ten
percent of the current assets of the reporting company). The forseeable conse-
quences of antitrust violations could well meet this test. See Panel Discussion. Is
There an Obligation to Report Violations, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 119 (1979).
Even in the absence of quantitative materiality, there could be a disclosure
question, for in the area of so-called questionable payments, the SEC has ad-
vanced an analysis which is not based upon traditional principles. Instead, in this
context the SEC has asserted that five factors are controlling: (1) falsification of
corporate records, (2) management participation or knowledge, (3) legality, (4)
identity of the recipients of the payments, and (5) the amounts involved and their
relation to the business of the reporting company. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (1976) (submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee of the Second Session of the 94th Congress). The SEC
has recently expanded the applicability of its analysis in the questionable
payments context to other areas, such as, so-called corporate "perquisites." See
Profusek, Nonmonetary Forms of Remuneration Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3, 4 n.9, 28 n.116 (1979). The SEC's approach in
these contexts has been heavily criticized. See Freeman, The Legality of the
SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1976); Kripke, Opening
Remarks on the Corporation in Crisis, 31 Bus. LAW. 1277 (1976). It has, however,
been adopted by some courts. E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp.
1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). Moreover this approach, particularly in its emphasis upon
management involvement in illegal or questionable conduct, is not completely
unique to matters such as questionable payments or corporate perquisites. See,
e.g., Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,505, at 92,440 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (the fact that a nominee for election as a director
was a defendant in an action alleging improper use of inside information was
deemed material under the federal proxy solicitation rules). As such, it would ap-
pear that the SEC's analysis could apply to any violation of law by a reporting
company, including an antitrust violation or present concealment of a past an-
titrust violation. See Mann, Watergate to Bananagate: What Lies Beyond?, 31
Bus. LAW. 1663, 1667 (1976).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). See note 11 infra.
" Various provisions of the federal securities laws, expressly or by implica-
tion, impose liability on reporting companies and their officers and directors for
misstatements or omissions of material facts in connection with documents or
reports distributed to shareholders or filed with the SEC. See generally Allen,
The Disclosure Obligations of Publicly Held Corporations in the Absence of In-
sider Trading, 25 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1974); Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Cor-
poration's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979). The primary ex-
ample is SEC Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
[Vol. 28:529
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-Are the attorney's duties, privileges and liabilities different if
he is also a director of the corporate client?"
-What are the attorney's ethical obligations under the Code of
Professional Responsibility?13 What would they be if the pro-
posed Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted? 4
-Should the attorney advise his client to take advantage of the
Voluntary Disclosure Program of the Department of Justice? 5
of any facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading....
Perhaps the best known cases under Rule lOb-5 involving claims for monetary
damages arising out of alleged failures to disclose material adverse information
are Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), and Financial In-
dus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). See generally Note, The Liability of Outside Direc-
tors under Rule 10b-5, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 551 (1974). For a discussion of potential
liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, see Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally, Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV.
1 (1969).
The reaction to the problem of so-called "questionable payments" suggests a
disclosure obligation, enforceable in private litigation, even in the absence of
financial materiality. In upholding a pleading seeking an injunction under § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), in Weisberg v. Coastal States
Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit wrote, "Furthermore,
plaintiffs allegation of a cover-up of the alleged bribes enhances the prospect that
she will succeed in demonstrating materiality, since we believe that share-
holders, in deciding which directors to elect, would consider such conduct, if it oc-
curred, more important than the initial authorization or the payments." Id. at
655.
State law may also provide a source of liability. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers,
77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
12 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Browning Arms Co., 528
F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1976); Knepper, Liability of Lawyer-Directors, 40 OHIO ST.
L.J. 341 (1979); Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34
Bus. LAW. 7 (1979).
1" See Frank, A Higher Duty: A New Look at the Ethics of the Corporate
Lawyer, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 337 (1977); Lorne, The Corporate and Securities
Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423
(1978); Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665
(1979).
" See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, (Discussion Draft, Jan.
30, 1980).
"5 See J. Shenefield, The Disclosure of Antitrust Violations and Prosecutorial
Discretion, (address before the 17th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute,
Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 4, 1978), summarized in [1979] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,388 at 55,858 (Nov. 13, 1978); Panel Discussion: Interview with J. Shenefield,
19791
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-Finally, to what extent, if at all, can the attorney recommend
destruction of evidence of the violation without him or his client
becoming criminally liable under the misprision of felony
statute?
There has been much concern over these questions, particularly since
violation of sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act1" became indictable as
felonies on December 21, 1974.17 Little has been written, however, on
the misprision issue. Antitrust practioners are not ordinarily trained ii
the contours of 18 U.S.C. § 4, the federal misprision statute. Our criminal
practice is typically in rarified and antiseptic economic fields, 8 and does
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 637, 646-49
(1979); To Confess or Not to Confess: Agonies of Uncovering Price Fixing, AN-
TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 861, § AA (Apr. 27, 1978).
-6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, & 3 (1976). Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court (emphasis added).
Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court (emphasis added).
Section 3 provides:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States
or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce be-
tween any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or
Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with
foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or
States or foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person who shall
make any such contract or engage in any such combination or con-
spiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court (emphasis added).
"7 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act-Expediting Act, Pub. L. No.
93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 & 3 (1974)).
18 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979);
[Vol. 28:529
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not concern bank robberies and kidnappings, where the misprision cases
are to be found. This article is intended to provide a familiarity which
may come to be needed.
Before turning to the misprision statute, it is important to mention
other federal statutes which may apply to a misprision problem, depend-
ing on the circumstances. These statutes include: obstruction of
justice;19 perjury and subordination of perjury; 0 false statements;2' ac-
cessory after the fact;2 obstruction of agency proceedings or of a civil
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
19 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976). Section 1503 provides, in pertinent part, that
"whoever ... corruptly... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to in-
fluence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." The section
normally applies only to proceedings pending before a federal court or grand
jury. See, e.g., Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 205 (1893); United States
v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754,
757 (9th Cir. 1970). Case law has held that specific criminal intent must be shown.
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. at 205; Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305
(5th Cir. 1962). See generally Note, Interpretation of Misrepresentation as found
in the Federal Obstruction of Criminal Investigation Statute, 14 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 117 (1978).
As to footnotes 19 through 27, see generally, Baker, The Control of Docu-
ments, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 35 (1979).
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621-22 (1976). The essential elements of perjury as defined
by section 1621 are "(1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) taken
before a competent tribunal, officer or person, and (3) a false statement willfully
made as to facts material to the hearing." United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374,
376 (1953). Subordination of perjury under section 1622 occurs when one procures
or instigates another to commit the crime of perjury. Petite v. United States, 147
F. Supp. 791 (D. Md. 1957), affl'd, 262 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1959), remanded on other
grounds, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). A charge of perjured testimony before a grand jury
can be brought under section 1621 as well as under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976) (false
declarations before a grand jury or court). United States v. Kahn, 340 F. Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
See generally, Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977); Note,
Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement: Securing Truth in the
Twentieth Century, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1681 (1977).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 1001 provides that "[wjhoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States know-
ingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a
material fact ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both." The statements may be oral or written and do not have
to be made under oath. United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977).
See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); United States v. Beacon
Brass Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 43 (1952); Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations
Under the Federal False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 316 (1977).
' 18 U.S.C. § 3 provides: "Whoever, knowing that an offense against the
United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the of-
fender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an
accessory after the fact." The reviser's note indicates that the statute was based
19791
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investigative demand;" contempt of court;' conspiracy; 25 aider and abet-
tor;26 and mutilation, etc., of documents demanded by the Federal Trade
Commission.'
on Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 757
(1935). As its wording shows, the statute applies only to assistance to "the of-
fender," and does not apply to actions taken to conceal only the crime. United
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1353 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barlow,
470 F.2d 1245, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See MILLER ON CRIMINAL LAW § 77 (1934).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976). Section 1505 subjects to criminal liability anyone
who "corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which [a)
proceeding is being had before [a] department or agency of the United States .......
The statute also applies to obstruction of compliance with a civil investigative de-
mand. The term agency "proceeding" in the statute has been broadly construed.
United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
", 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). Subsection 3 of the contempt statute allows the court
to punish "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command." See generally United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973), supplemented 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1974). (corporation's officers had an affirmative duty to act to insure
compliance with court order). A corporation would be vulnerable to prosecution
under this statute if, for example, it allowed destruction of documents which it
was required to preserve under an outstanding antitrust decree or if it failed to
comply with a valid grand jury subpoena. United States v. National Gypsum Co.,
1972 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,173 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691
(1976).
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Section 371 provides that "If two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States .... and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
The section covers both felonies and misdemeanors and has been linked with the
obstruction of justice provisions. (18 U.S.C. § 1503). See United States v. Perl-
stein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 678 (1942). On at least two occa-
sions the Antitrust Division has challenged the selective destruction of cor-
porate records under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1503. United States v. Treadway, 445
F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (indictment quashed); United States v. Turen,
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074 at 53,572-74 (D.N.J.
May 16, 1974).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). This statute states, in part, that one who "aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures" an offense against the United States is
punishable as a principal. It has been used to charge the directing heads of cor-
porations with criminal liability for the unlawful acts of subordinates, regardless
of whether they were present when the acts were committed or personally super-
vised the acts. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.),
aff'd, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
- 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1976). The second paragraph of this section subjects to
criminal liability anyone who shall wilfully "mutilate, alter, or . . . falsify"
documents required to be kept by a corporation under the Act. "Destroy" ap-
peared in the Senate version of the bill but not in the final version. See S. REP.
No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See also United States v. Cannon, 117 F.
Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. 11. 1953). 8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/3
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The difference between the misprision statute and these other
statutes is that, as their texts indicate, most (the exceptions being aider
and abettor, accessory after the fact, and conspiracy) seem to be ap-
plicable only when some kind of government involvement is present.
For example, a person must be under oath, or be making statements to
the government, or be subject to a court order or decree; justice must
be in the process of being "administered"; or a Civil Investigative De-
mand or a grand jury subpoena must have been issued. The misprision
statute, however, applies even when there is no government involve-
ment of any kind. This article is directed to situations where none of
these other obligations is being violated.
III. PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW
The current federal statute governing misprision of felony, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4, requires:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a
felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and
does not as soon as possible make known the same to some
judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both."s
The statute's antecedents stretch back to section 6 of "An Act for the
Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States," enacted on
April 30, 1790, by the Second Session of the First Congress.' Most
courts applying the misprision statute adopt the formulation of the
elements set out in Neal v. United States,3 as generalized and quoted in
Lancey v. United States:
- 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (enacted in this form as Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat.
684).
" 1 Stat. 113, § 6 (1790).
And be it [further] enacted, That if any person having knowledge of the
actual commission of the crime of wilful murder or other felony, upon
the high seas, or within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other
place or district of country, under the ,sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to some one of the judges or other persons in civil
or military authority under the United States, on conviction thereof,
such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of misprision of felony,
and shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not ex-
ceeding five hundred dollars.
Id.
, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as accessory after the fact aff'd
following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941).
" 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966). See also United
States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1977).
19791
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
To sustain a conviction * * * for misprision of felony it was in-
cumbent upon the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that * * * the principal had committed and completed
the felony alleged * * * ; (2) that the defendant had full know-
ledge of that fact; (3) that he failed to notify the authorities; and
(4) that he took *** affirmative steps to conceal the crime of the
principal.
32
With that brief introduction to the background of the statute3  and a
general overview of its coverage, the statute will now be examined ele-
ment by element to determine its application to the antitrust field.
IV. THE ELEMENTS
A. "Whoever,"
The statute can be violated by "who[m]ever." Relevant in determining
the scope of "whoever" is 1 U.S.C. § 1: "In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . .. the
words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associa-
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well
as individuals . ...3' Despite this broad definition, no reported case
reflects the indictment of anyone other than an individual. Never-
theless, the possibility of the indictment of a corporation, which does
not have a fifth amendment privilege, should not be ignored. Con-
ceivably, the cumulative knowledge of all of the corporation's agents
could be imputed to the corporation. If any one of the agents had under-
taken an act of concealment of a felony which the corporation had not
reported, an indictment of the entity might lie. Indeed, the possibility
exists that a corporation might be indicted for misprision because its
agents had engaged in price fixing, and therefore knew of the commis-
sion of a felony, had not reported it, and may have taken actions to con-
ceal it.35
" 356 F.2d at 409. This precise formulation has also been approved by the
Sixth Circuit. United States v. Stuard, 566 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1977) (modifying
previous formulation of the requisite elements); United States v. Norman, 391
F.2d 212, 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1014 (1968).
1 The origins of the crime in the early English law are traced in Glazebrook,
Misprision of Felony-Shadow or Phantom?, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189, 283
(1964), whose conclusion is that there was no common law crime of misprision of a
felony, although Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecution, [1962] A. C. 528 (1961),
[1961] 3 All E.R. 33 holds the contrary. The historical materials cited in Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972); Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United
States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 565-66 (D. Mass. 1960 and 1961); Goldberg,
Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context, 52 A.B.A. J. 148 (1966),
and Note, Misprision of Felony: A Reappraisal, 23 EMORY L.J. 1095 (1974), may
also be of interest.
1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
The Antitrust Division is not yet pursuing such a policy. On February 7,
1980, an indictment was returned containing in paragraph 12(g) the following
[Vol. 28:529
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If the statute were successfully so used, it would become a vehicle
pursuant to which a corporation might be thought to have a duty to
come forward and report its wrongdoing. If it did not do so, it could be
subject to a misprision indictment, at least if acts of concealment had
taken place or were taking place. Such a duty could be found to lie even
at a relatively advanced stage of a government investigation, since, as
will be shown, prior knowledge of the authorities that a felony had been
committed and also the identity of the perpetrator thereof would not
relieve the corporation from the operation of the misprision statute."
Two comments on the above possibility may be appropriate. First,
since a corporation cannot be sent to jail, the $500 fine provided for by
the misprision statute may not be thought meaningful, apart from
whatever collateral consequences may result from a felony conviction."
Second, the significance of the United States Supreme Court's quotation
from Blackstone in Branzburg v. Hayes,38 where it is said that at com-
mon law misprision of felony constituted "the concealment of a felony
'which a man knows, but never assented to . . . [so as to become] either
principal or accessory . . . ,,,9 must be evaluated. If the federal mispri-
sion statute can be construed in the light of this common law definition,
then it would seem that "whoever" only means those persons who are
not themselves guilty of the main offense, either directly or as an aider
and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2."1 No case under 18 U.S.C. § 4 has been
found where a person was indicted for both a substantive felony and
also for misprision of that substantive felony. The argument in favor of
any such construction is quite compelling, for otherwise virtually any
person who committed a felony would automatically be guilty of the sec-
ond felony of misprision, since such a person would have knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime, would not have reported it, and
would ordinarily have taken actions to conceal it, as well as himself,
from the authorities. Perhaps, however, this was exactly the state of af-
fairs in the early law, for Blackstone also wrote, "that a misprision is
contained in every treason and felony whatsoever; and that, if the king
so please, the offender may be proceeded against for the misprision
alleged overt act: "concealing the allocation of projects and the submission of col-
lusive bids and destroying documents recording meetings at which projects were
allocated and the results of said meetings." If there ever were a case in which a
corporate indictment for both misprision and violation of the Sherman Act were
appropriate, it would appear to have been this one. United States v. Western
Concrete Structures Co., Crim. No. 80-114 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1980) (indictment).
See notes 82-83 infra and accompanying text.
See generally, Symposium-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970); Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA.
L. REV. 403 (1967).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
" See note 26 supra.
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only." This quotation could mean, however, that the King could take
his choice, not that he could choose both.
B. "having knowledge"
The "knowledge" required is knowledge of the "actual" commission of
a felony and, as the cases cited in the succeeding section will show, if
the government does not prove the actual commission of a felony at the
trial of the person indicted for misprision, then acquittal will be re-
quired. 2 The cases are not very clear on the quality of knowledge which
a person must have for the statute to be applicable to him. Is mere
suspicion enough? Is reasonable cause to believe enough? Clearly the
government must prove the knowledge element beyond a reasonable
doubt, but this means only that the question is one for the jury under
proper instructions, and an appellate court would presumably not
disturb a jury verdict "if there is substantial evidence, taking the view
most favorable to the Government, to support it."4 3
In the conventional statement of the elements of the offense," the
word "full" modifies the word "knowledge", which would suggest that
mere suspicion is not enough. If this is sound, then it necessarily raises
the question whether it is wise, if mere suspicion exists, to attempt fully
to develop the facts before taking prophylactic measures; for developing
the facts so that one has "full knowledge" may be the very thing that
may trigger the misprision statute and prevent any such measures from
being implemented.
A few comments may be made with a little more certainty than the
above speculation. First, it is required not only that the misprision
defendant know that a crime has been committed, but also that he know
the identity of the perpetrator. Thus, the conventional statement of the
elements of the crime includes proof that "the principal had committed
and completed the felony alleged."'5 This aspect of the requirement of
knowledge is illustrated in Lancey v. United States." There, in finding
that defendant Lancey had acquired the requisite knowledge prior to his
arrest for concealing and failing to report a crime of bank robbery com-
mitted by one Zavada, the court held:
41 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 119 (4th ed. MDCCLXXI). In Branzburg, the
Supreme Court noted that the Statute has been construed to require "some affir-
mative act of concealment or participation." 408 U.S. at 696 n.36 (emphasis
added). See also Castaneda de Esper v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
557 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1977). But see Glazebrook, note 33 supra, at 194-97.
" Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922
(1966); United States v. Heckler, 428 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
" Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
" See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
, See note 32 supra and accompanying text (emphasis added).
46 356 F.2d 407, 409, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966).
[Vol. 28:529
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Here it may well be that despite the defendant's knowledge
that Zavada was named on television as the bank robber, and
that the method used coincided with Zavada's modus operandi,
when he heard this television news at 8:00 P.M. on June 11,
1964, or even at 11:00 P.M. when he recorded a second television
newscast, he had no obligation to notify the civil authorities.
But one half hour later, when Lancey's telephone rang and he
was told to pick up Zavada at a street intersection in San Jose,
he had information the civil authorities presumably did not
have. One and one half hours later when Zavada came to
Lancey's home, carrying thousands of dollars in a laundry type
bag, any lack of certain knowledge as to the commission of a
felony and who had committed it was laid at rest."
This quotation from Lancey is interesting in that it reflects that there
may be a point in time when one has some knowledge, but not enough to
trigger section 4, while, when additional knowledge is obtained, section
4 may then become applicable.
Particularly interesting from this standpoint is In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation."8 There the government filed a motion to compel production
of certain documents demanded by a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
The subpoena was served on a law firm acting as counsel to a bank
which had made certain loans. The applicants for those loans were
thought to have made false statements in applying for them in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and the bank was thought possibly to have concealed
the applicants' offense. The documents subpoenaed were law firm
memoranda dealing with the question whether the applicants had, in-
deed, committed a felony. The question arose only because the bank had
waived the attorney-client privilege. In this context, Judge Becker
stated:
The grand jury suspects that certain bank customers may
have made false statements in applying for loans, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1014. Also under investigation, however, is the
possibility that certain bank officers, knowing that criminally
false statements had been made in loan applications, actively
concealed that information from responsible authorities, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 4, which forbids misprision of felony. Thus,
the advices of counsel to bank employees regarding the legal ef-
fect of particular statements in loan applications could bear on
whether the bank or its officers had "knowledge of the actual
commission of a felony," an element of misprision. Concomi-
tantly, the bank officers' knowledge of their obligation (if any) to
" Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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report what they knew might, in the grand jury's view, bear on
their criminality vel non.'9
Several of the memoranda were ordered to be produced over the law
firm's "work product" objection, on the ground that they had been
prepared before litigation was actually anticipated. The interesting
aspect of the court's analysis, however, is the clearly implicit suggestion
that legal research may be relevant to the determination of whether
there has been an "actual commission of a felony" and that, until that
research has been done, a person's knowledge of the facts may not con-
stitute the requisite knowledge under the statute. As will be noted
below, this same thought has clear implication with respect to what "as
soon as possible" may mean."
C. "of the actual commission"
There is no question but that the underlying felony must be proved in
the trial of a person indicted for misprision. 1 If trial under the mispri-
sion indictment is separate from and subsequent to trial under the in-
dictment for the underlying felony, the question arises whether the
record of conviction in the first trial can be admitted in the misprision
trial. No misprision case indicates that any such record has been admit-
ted, and it seems likely that admission of that record would be an un-
constitutional violation of the right to confrontation guaranteed by the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.52 Barone v. United
States,' indicates that this is the case with respect to an accessory after
the fact prosecution, citing Kirby v. United States." In the only relevant
misprision case, United States v. Hodges,55 the court assumed, but did
not decide, that a mere reference to the prior conviction of the substan-
tive offense "was improper."'
" Id. at 945.
5o See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
SI Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
922 (1966); United States v. Heckler, 428 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). The sixth amend-
ment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205 F.2d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 1953).
174 U.S. 47 (1899).
51 566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit also noted that the trial
court had ruled evidence of the underlying conviction (kidnapping) inadmissible.
' Id. at 676.
[Vol. 28:529
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Since the underlying felony must be proved in the misprision trial, a
federal prosecutor presumably would be tempted to join the offenses
and the defendants so that the trial on both the underlying felony indict-
ment and the misprision indictment would be conducted at the same
time. Such joinder has been held proper."'
D. "of a felony"
As stated succinctly in Miller v. United States,6 "[tihere is no mispri-
sion of a misdemeanor . . . ."9 This conclusion seems clearly to be re-
quired by the words of the statute.8'
Determination of the offenses which are felonies would presumably be
made under 18 U.S.C. § 1. "Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the
contrary: (1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year is a felony."'" In light of this definition, viola-
tions of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act 2 and section 10 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, second paragraph, 3 are felonies, but
violations of section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act," section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 5 section 10 of the Clayton Act,68 and section 10 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, first and fourth paragraphs 7 are
not.
E. "cognizable by a court of the United States,"
Not only must the underlying offense be a felony, it must be a federal
felony.u Thus, in Neal v. United States,"' an early leading case, the
defendant's brother had been stealing for a long period of time, by
17 United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d, 1226 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
974 (1975); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dis-
missed sub nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
905 (1971).
230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 489 n.7.
6o See United States v. Venturini, 1 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ala. 1931) where the
court stated, "Having held that the offense committed .. .was a misdemeanor
and not a felony, of course [the] defendant cannot be held under the second count
which charges misprision of felony." Id. at 215. See also Presont v. United States,
281 F. 131 (6th Cir. 1922).
61 18 U.S.C. § 1(I)(1976).
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, & 3 (1976). See note 16 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 50 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976).
67 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1976).
' See United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944).
69 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as accessory after the fact aff'd
following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941).
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means of artifice, monies belonging to a bank. His particular technique,
however, had been made a federal felony only recently. The court seem-
ed to indicate quite clearly that the defendant's secreting a portion of
the stolen money in a golf bag and altering corporate books to expunge
any record of the contributions of capital by the thief to the defendant's
corporation were acts of misprision. Since such acts could equally have
shown concealment of the thievery constituting a state felony or the
thievery constituting the recently made federal felony, the conviction of
the defendant was reversed.
F. "conceals and"
In Branzburg v. Hayes,7 the Supreme Court, in dictum, stated, "[t]his
statute [18 U.S.C. § 41 has been construed, however, to require both
knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or par-
ticipation."72 This requirement is often stated in two ways. First, it is
said that mere silence or mere failure to report is not enough to
establish the crime."3 Alternatively, some cases state the requirement
the other way, namely, that an affirmative act of concealment must be
alleged."
The cases which might be cited to suggest that an affirmative act is
not required are clearly distinguishable and reflect sensitivity to the col-
lateral consequences of 18 U.S.C. § 4 rather than direct attention to the
elements of the offense. For example, in Grudin v. United States"5 the
Ninth Circuit dealt with a contempt order resulting from an allegedly
improper assertion of the appellant's fifth amendment rights before a
grand jury. The appellant had admitted to writing a certain letter to a
used car dealer prior to the point in time when that dealer had been
70 Cases may arise where it is unclear whether courts before which an offense
was cognizable were "of the United States." In such cases the definition of the
"United States" as it appears in 18 U.S.C. § 5 should be consulted. Section 5 pro-
vides, "[tihe term 'United States,' as used in this title in a territorial sense, in-
cludes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, except the Canal Zone."
7' 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 696 n.36 (1972). Accord, Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358,
1363 (1980).
18 United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir. 1977); Sullivan v. United States,-411 F.2d
556, 558 (10th Cir. 1969); Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515, 517 (D.
Mass.), dismissal of indictment aff'd without discussion of misprision count, 281
U.S. 624 (1930).
' United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir. 1977); Bratton v.
United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38
F.2d 515, 517 (D. Mass.), dismissal of indictment aff'd without discussion of
misprision count, 281 U.S. 624 (1930).
75 198 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1952).
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linked to a suspect in an espionage investigation. Following such
linkage, the appellant was asked additional questions about the car tran-
saction which he refused to answer on the grounds that the answers
might incriminate him. The district court found him in contempt on the
basis that he had waived his privilege by virtue of his earlier answer.
The Ninth Circuit, noting that at the time of the earlier answer there
had been no connection between the car transaction and the espionage
suspect but that there was such a connection at the time of the subse-
quent refusals to answer for which he was held in contempt, stated with
respect to those refusals:
They quite well could be incriminating because if Grudin had
learned in the ten days after January 28, 1946, that Goodman
was engaged in the actual commission of a felony in violating
the espionage act and did not as soon as possible make it known
to some judge or other person in civil or military authority, he
was guilty of the crime of misprision of felony. 18 U.S.C. § 4.11
This holding was clearly correct, since one is entitled to his fifth
amendment privilege if any answer would forge "a link in the chain of
evidence"77 even though it would not by itself completely incriminate
him. The case, properly construed, should not be held to read the con-
cealment element out of the misprision statute.
United States v. Smith"8 is more difficult to explain. The defendant
was charged under the federal blackmail statute. 9 The indictment
charged that the defendant union representative, under a threat of in-
forming authorities that the American Tent Company had committed a
fraud on the Army's Quartermaster Corps, demanded that the company
recall to work three employees of the union which he represented. In
upholding the indictment the court stated:
Secondly, and in addition, the consideration offered must have
been unlawful. The indictment specifies that defendant's con-
sideration was 'not reporting certain information concerning
alleged fraud in a contract between the American Tent Com-
pany and the Quartermaster Corps of the United States Army.'
The Quartermaster Corps is an agency of the United States, and
any fraud perpetrated upon that agency is punishable by up to
five years' imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Furthermore,
it is a felony as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1. Moreover, anyone hav-
ing knowledge of the commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States must report such information as soon
as possible or himself be guilty of a crime. The indictment states
76 Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
7' See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
78 228 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. La. 1964).
79 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1976).
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that the defendant had knowledge of a fraud and that he offered
to withhold that information. Such consideration is thus
unlawful and comprises the second element of the blackmail
here charged. 0
It may be that the court's analysis was immaterial, since the underly-
ing statute certainly does not, in express terms, require that the con-
sideration be shown to be unlawful. Title 18 U.S.C. § 873 states only,
"[w]hoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not in-
forming, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands
or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined .... ""
Moreover, the "consideration for not informing" was reinstatement of
the three union employees and not withholding information about the
fraud on the Quartermaster Corps. The court's analysis simply does not
parse. In any event, the case did not focus directly on the sufficiency of
a misprision indictment.
One point which seems to be clearly established by the cases is that a
person is guilty of concealment even though the authorities know that
the crime has been committed and know the person who has committed
it.82 Indeed, a conviction for misprision has been affirmed when the acts
of concealment took place after indictments had been returned for the
underlying crime." Accordingly, it must be concluded that for purposes
of the misprision statute a defendant "conceals" a crime even though
there is no relationship between his concealment and the authority's
knowledge or lack of knowledge of the crime.
Before noting the various acts which have been held to constitute con-
cealment, three questions are worth independent examination. The first
is to what extent intent is an element of this aspect of the offense; the
second is whether lying to authorities for the purposes of throwing
them off the track constitutes concealment; and the third is whether ac-
ceptance of money for nondisclosure constitutes concealment.
1. Intent as an Element
On the question of intent United States v. King84 is relevant. There
the defendant allegedly accepted "some" money obtained in a bank rob-
bery. Defendant, who had heard the original planning, apparently did
not believe that the robbers would do the deed. Upon hearing them
228 F. Supp. 345, 348 (emphasis added).
8118 U.S.C. § 873 (1976).
82 Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407, 409-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 922 (1966); United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
1 United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
dismissed sub nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 905 (1971).
1 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
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state that the deed had been done, defendant initially expressed
disbelief. On these facts the question was whether accepting "some" of
the proceeds was an act of concealment:
The record does not indicate how much money defendant
received from his brother or why it was given to him. There is
no testimony indicating that a purpose of defendant in receiving
the money was to hide it for the principals, or to otherwise con-
ceal information about the crime, or to in any other way assist
the principals in making their escape or avoiding detection. For
all this record discloses, defendant may have received only ten
dollars out of the robbery proceeds, in repayment of a prior loan
to his brother ....
We therefore conclude that on this meager evidence it was
not established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's act
and purpose in receiving 'some' money from the robbery was an
affirmative step designed to conceal the crime, or that it had
that effect. 5
The interesting aspect of this holding is that it appears to make the
question of concealment turn on intent or "purpose." Did defendant
receive the money for the purpose of buying his silence, or did he
receive it, for example, to pay a debt?
This kind of question could obviously be relevant on the effect of a
corporate decision to allow a record retention program to continue. Was
the purpose to get rid of enormously burdensome volumes of paper, or
was the purpose to conceal the commission of a felony? Similarly, im-
agine a situation where past statistical data identifying actual transac-
tional prices to named customers by named competitors had been main-
tained and disseminated by a trade association. The question could be
whether such statistical reports were destroyed to suppress evidence of
an arguable antitrust crime," or instead whether they were destroyed
in order that pricing officials of the company would not have access to
them in order to use them for an improper purpose. Certainly
"conceals" seems to have an element of intent in it and the King case is
one which would permit an argument that intent, with respect to the re-
quirement of "conceals," is relevant.
2. Lying to Authorities
A second question is whether lying to authorities for the purpose of
throwing them off the track in their search for the person believed to
" Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d
815, 822 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant's intent in misprision trial constitutes a fact
question). Federal criminal statutes are typically construed to include an intent
element. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-38 (1978).
" See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
19791
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
have committed the underlying felony is an act of concealment. The
cases have uniformly concluded that it is, even though the lies are not
committed under oath or by one arguably having a duty to tell the truth
(such as a law enforcement officer has to his superior). Thus, in United
States v. Hodges,7 the holding of the court was that "the giving of an
untruthful statement to authorities is a sufficient act of concealment to
sustain a conviction for misprision of felony."' The obvious conclusion is
that lying to FBI agents or Antitrust Division attorneys, even in infor-
mal interviews which are not conducted under oath and especially in
proffers tendered to obtain immunity, may be interpreted as an act of
concealment. 9
3. Accepting Money as an Act of Concealment
The third issue to be separately identified is whether acceptance of
money, which might or might not be a share of the feloniously obtained
loot, constitutes an act of concealment. The early, leading case of Brat-
ton v. United States," held that receiving payment could not be an act
of concealment. The court there said, "[tihe consideration paid is the
motive for, and not an act of, concealment."91
This seems sound for, while receiving money in return for silence may
make it more likely that the silence will continue, receiving money does
not make it any more difficult for the authorities to uncover the crime.
Paid-for silence is still merely silence. Solicitation of money, or any
other valuable thing, in return for silence could, however, raise a signifi-
cant question under the federal blackmail statute.
92
The argument that a paid-for agreement not to disclose could be con-
sidered an act of concealment does gain support from dictum in King,
93
where the Ninth Circuit said that if "the jury could infer that
defendant's brother gave defendant some of the money in order to keep
defendant quiet about the crime, and that defendant had this purpose in
mind in receiving the money," then the "receipt of the money by defend-
ant would be an affirmative act fulfilling the fourth essential element of
the crime [an affirmative step to conceal]." 9 4
566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 675 (citing United States v. Pittman, 527 F.2d 444, 445 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); Lancey v. United States, 357 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966)).
' It may be, however, that if a defendant was a suspect in custody at the time
he lied, his lies cannot be used to show concealment unless he was given Miranda
warnings. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). See United States v. Pittman,
527 F.2d 444, 445 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976).
,0 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
91 Id. at 798.
- 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1976). See United States v. Smith, 228 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.
La. 1964).
3 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
" Id. at 696.
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In a different vein, it might be argued that acceptance of money by
one who had a duty, because of his position in a law enforcement agency,
to report the crime would evidence an affirmative act of concealment. In
United States v. Blasco," the Seventh Circuit found "the essential
elements of the crime" present when the only apparent action by the
Chicago police defendants which could constitute concealment was that
the defendants "reportedly received approximately $1,000.00 from Sam
Johnson [who] was not arrested."" The court found that the defendants
"concealed [the offense of distributing heroin] in exchange for the pay-
ment of a bribe.
9 7
This argument, if sound, is far reaching. In the antitrust context,
there could well be situations where the pervasiveness of the violation
and the probable resultant treble damage exposure could be thought to
trigger a reporting requirement to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission." In such circumstances, a person such as the corporation's
secretary, or its outside counsel who was its assistant secretary, who ac-
cepted money, a promotion, or excessive legal fees in consideration for
failure to make that report, could conceivably be thought to have con-
cealed the violation. Suppose an Antitrust Division attorney accepted an
advantageous legal position in a company under grand jury investiga-
tion without first disclosing to his superiors the results of a lengthy in-
criminating examination of the company's documents. Is that attorney
guilty of concealment?"
Some hypothetical examples will illustrate the difficulty and uncer-
tainty in this area with regard to accepting payments. May an employee
implicated in a felonious antitrust violation demand, and may his cor-
porate employer accept, his early retirement? Is there a difference if he
demands, and the company grants, his early retirement with generous
severance pay? May a corporate employer promote such an employee?
May it assign him to head up its Bolivian branch office? May it do this
with a $10,000 yearly in-lieu-of-leave payment if he does not return to
the United States? All that can be said is that most of these examples
would seem to present a fact question for a jury, and evidence on the in-
tent underlying such actions would be relevant and admissible.
It would seem clear that if the money given to a misprision defendant
was all or a portion of the loot and it was received by that defendant
0 581 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1978), convictions rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 684 n.6.
7 Id.
See notes 7-9 supra.
" Without much question, a person paying money or otherwise acting to
cause another's silence has committed an act of concealment. See United States
v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed sub nom., Montagna v.
United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971); United States v.
King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
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for the purposes of secreting it or otherwise making it difficult for the
authorities to locate, then the payment would constitute an affirmative
act of concealment.0 ° This would be so, not because the money con-
stituted a bribe, but because the money constituted the fruits of the
crime and concealing the fruits would help conceal the crime."'
Acts done knowingly and wilfully which have been found in fact or in
dictum to constitute acts of concealment include the following: hiding
the loot for those who had stolen it;' 2 hiding the means or instrumen-
talities of a crime;" 3 changing license plates;' 4 falsifying books to con-
ceal corporate contributions made with embezzled money;' registering
an escaped felon in a hotel room'0 6 under an assumed name;' surgically
obliterating a fleeing fugitive's fingerprints and identifying scars;0 8 pro-
viding an escaped felon with money; 10 9 attempting to silence persons
having knowledge of a crime by giving them a lie detector test which, if
they failed, would lead to their murder; 110 attempting to silence persons
by, more prosaically, paying them money;' lying about receipt of the
proceeds of a bank robbery;"2 suppression of the evidence"' camouflag-
ing three bank robbers' return to their cached loot, by driving them
there with defendant's wife and baby in a car pulling defendant's boat;"
100 United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976); Sullivan v. United
States, 411 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1969); Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966).
"I Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as accessory
after the fact aff'd following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 679 (1941).
102 United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976).
" Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922
(1966).
"u United States v. Norman, 391 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1968).
100 Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as accessory
after the fact aff'd following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 679 (1941).
1I" United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
107 United States v. Thornton, 178 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
100 United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944).
109 United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
"1 United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed sub
nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
I" United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
" United States v. Pittman, 527 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
923 (1976); Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1969).
11 Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as an ac-
cessory after the fact aff'd following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941); Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir.
1934).
"' United States v. Gravitt, 590 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1979).
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and falsely denying to authorities knowledge about a kidnapped child." 5
All of these actions constitute requisite affirmative acts of concealment
which trigger the misprision statute if the other elements are present.
G. "does not as soon as possible"
"As soon as possible" obviously contains an element of elasticity;
what is "possible" may be subject to differing interpretations. Accord-
ingly, it is likely that this element will present a jury question unless
the defendant did not make any report of the underlying crime, which
will probably be the usual case. Thus, under a predecessor statute in
which the "as soon as possible" requirement was phrased "as soon as
may be," the court in Neal v. United States,"6 stated:
The sufficiency of the charge is not assailed, but it is claimed
that defendant did not fail to disclose 'as soon as may be'; that
he did in fact as shown by the government's evidence disclose all
that he knew on the fourth, fifth and sixth of January, 1938. The
evidence also shows that he made no disclosures until after he
had been frightened into doing so by the federal officers who
were investigating the crime. He might have given them such in-
formation on the 28th of December, 1937, but instead of doing so
he 'threw dust in their eyes' when they interviewed him and
gave them misleading information. Under the evidence it was a
question for the jury to determine whether he made the
disclosure 'as soon as may be' to satisfy the requirements of the
law. 7
It would seem that the duty to make known "as soon as possible" can-
not arise until the knowledge requirement is met in that the duty is re-
quired only of one who has knowledge. This not only seems to follow
logically from the structure of the misprision statute but can be deduced
from In re Grand Jury Investigation."8 From the facts of that case it can
be inferred that the bank officers knew all available facts, but the court
held that the legal research memoranda were relevant on the question
whether those facts reflected knowledge of the "actual commission"
of a felony. The memoranda could not have been relevant if the duty to
disclose had already arisen; thus the requirement to disclose "as soon as
possible" does not apply until "full knowledge" is acquired. This would
seem to mean that, for example, where an antitrust violation is
suspected but not all of the facts are known or where the facts are
known but the legal significance of them requires intense legal analysis,
"' United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977).
116 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as an accessory after the fact aff'd
following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1941).
"I Id. at 649.
" 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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time to investigate either this factual or legal question is permitted
before the necessity of disclosing "as soon as possible" arises.
It should also be noted that the duty to disclose does not arise until
the felony is "completed.""' 9 This has significance in the antitrust con-
text because making the illegal agreement is, by itself, the crime;
neither overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy nor success in achiev-
ing the end goal of the conspiracy is required for criminality.' 0
In at least two cases defendants contended that they did not have a
duty to disclose until they had an opportunity to do so free from duress
and fear of physical retaliation.' In Lancey, the court found that the
defendant did have ample opportunity but noted that "[w]ere [fear] a
defense, there seldom could be a conviction." '22 In Roberts, these ques-
tions were not answered by the court because they were raised for the
first time in defendant's appellate brief, although he had ample oppor-
tunity to raise them at the trial level.2 3
In view of the gravity and possible financial consequence of an anti-
trust felony, it is important to consider whether "as soon as possible"
permits time for an investigation, a report to the corporation's board,
executive committee, or senior officers and a decision by them on
whether to disclose. Former Assistant Attorney General Shenefield has
made clear that the Antitrust Division thinks a report is imperative. "I
think it is significant that the lawyer has an obligation to tell his client.
The one thing he cannot do in good conscience is forget about it. He has
to tell his client."'2 4 In view of this position, it would be surprising and
anomalous for the Division to exercise its discretion to indict for mispri-
sion on a theory that "mak[ing] known" was required prior to an in-
vestigation and corporate decision.
H. "make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or
military authority under the United States"
The vaguely defined and quite large number of persons to whom a
felony may be made known, thereby avoiding criminality under the
misprision statute, seems, on first reading, surprising. The explanation
"' United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977).
120 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
1'' Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358 (1980); Lancey v. United States,
356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966).
" 356 F.2d at 410.
123 100 S. Ct. at 1360.
12 Panel Discussion: Interview with John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 775, 795 (1978). See In re Carter,
[1979 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (SEC ALJ Decision, Mar. 7,
1979), argument before SEC summarized in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 532, §
AA (Dec. 12, 1979); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1.13(b)(3)
(Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
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probably lies in history. In 1790, when the predecessor of the current
statute was passed, the phrase "some judge" included only the chief
justice and five associate justices of the Supreme Court and the thirteen
judges of the district courts. 5 These were all the judges there were
"under the United States" at that time.
The scope of a "person in civil ... authority under the United States"
should be contrasted, as to the level of authority required, with section
two of the 1790 Criminal Code'" providing punishment for misprision of
treason. There it is specifically provided that the disclosure may be
made only to the "President of the United States, or some one of the
judges thereof" plus certain state officals.
The only felonies to which the initial misprision statute applied were
those committed in certain military installations "or other place or
district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States."'27 As a result, "persons ... in civil authority" could well
have meant the person or persons in authority in such "other place or
district of country." With the broadening of the statute to misprision of
felonies merely "cognizable by a court of the United States," the scope
of persons to whom a disclosure permissibly could be made would seem
to have been broadened accordingly.
No case has defined a "person in civil ... authority." Presumably such
persons, now, would include at least United States Attorneys and their
legal staffs, Justice Department attorneys, and FBI agents. If the felony
were a crime against the government, presumably such a person would
also include the head of, or senior executives in, the agency involved. Do
such persons also include the ambassador in charge of the United States
embassy in Senegal, a forest ranger in a national park, and the local ad-
ministrator of the Social Security System? Would a letter to such a per-
son making known a price-fixing felony avoid the misprision statute?
The statute's reference to "person in ...military authority" is ex-
plained by the fact that the early statute focused particularly on "wilful
murder . . .within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard [or] magazine."'u5 Thus,
the persons to whom a murder should be made known were presumably
the military officers in authority at those places. With respect to
felonies committed on federal military installations, that interpretation
would seem sound today.
A fascinating problem is suggested with respect to the reporting
aspect of the statute in United States v. King,'" where the court stated,
"[wie find nothing in the record bearing upon the third essential ele-
1 Stat. 73 (1790).
1 Stat. 112 (1790).
"7 1 Stat. 113 (1790).
128 Id.
129 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
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ment, namely, that defendant failed to notify the authorities. However,
defendant makes no point of this and apparently concedes that the
Government proved the first three elements of the crime."'"' To whom is
the report to be made? With respect to the usual felony, including anti-
trust violations, there is no statutorily prescribed place at which, or per-
son to whom, a crime must be reported. The question arises how the
government can prove this element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, at least if the defendant does not take the stand and has not
made any out-of-court admissions. Suppose on cross-examination
defense counsel asked the government's witnesses if they knew
whether the defendant had reported the underlying felony to a roster of
persons which included all federal judges, all FBI agents, all United
States attorneys, and all Antitrust Division attorneys. How would the
government negate the possibility of a report having been made to one
of those persons, even on a possibly inadmissible hearsay basis?
One court has even gone so far as to question whether the misprision
statute can be applied in the absence of a requirement to make a report
of the wrongdoing. In dismissing the indictment, the court stated, "[tlhe
misprision of a felony statute appears to be applicable only in a limited
number of cases where the place of filing or reporting is specified by
law."'' This conclusion is surprising and is belied sub silentio by all of
the cases affirming misprision convictions where the place of reporting
was not specified, but no case has been found expressly rejecting this
line of reasoning. Indeed, it is supported to a limited extent by Bratton
v. United States, 32 although Bratton addressed the question only in the
context of venue.
In addition to the problem of where to report the violation, it is fairly
clear that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may
stand as a bar to the application of the misprision statute. The reason-
ing proceeds that an individual (although not a corporation)"3 has an ab-
solute right not to incriminate himself. There could be cases where his
disclosure of the underlying felony would be a link in a chain of evidence
which might lead to his own prosecution as an accessory after the fact
under 18 U.S.C. § 3,' as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2,135 as a con-
spirator under 18 U.S.C. § 371,136 or as a perpetrator of any one of a wide
variety of possible crimes.'37 Having such a right against self-
130 Id. at 695-96.
131 United States v. Heckler, 428 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
12 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
11 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338
F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1964).
184 See note 19 supra.
"1 See note 26 supra.
in See note 25 supra.
17 See generally notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
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incrimination, the individual therefore had an absolute right not to
make any report of the underlying felony. The conclusion drawn from
this line of reasoning is that an individual cannot be constitutionally pro-
secuted for a crime, one element of which requires him to do something
he has a constitutional right not to do. Therefore a misprision indict-
ment in the circumstances postulated cannot stand. The Ninth Circuit
accepted this approach in United States v. King.'3' The Seventh Circuit,
although originally rejecting King in United States v. Daddano,"'9 subse-
quently distinguished its own Daddano case,' and recently has limited
it into oblivion."'
In applying the fifth amendment as a bar to a misprision conviction, it
is important to ask whether the misprison defendant was legitimately in
jeopardy at the time he first obtained "full knowledge" of the actual
commission of the underlying felony."12 A defendant cannot obtain the
requisite knowledge, accept a portion of the stolen bank money, and
thereafter claim that the fifth amendment prohibits his prosecution for
misprision because his disclosure would have incriminated him on a
possible receiving count. The point is that the duty to disclose arose
before he had accepted the stolen money.
The fifth amendment question can also arise at an earlier point in
time, such as during questioning before a grand jury. Thus, it has been
held that one can properly invoke the fifth amendment before a grand
jury when being questioned about his knowledge of an underlying
felony if he has reasonable cause to believe that his answer might tend
to incriminate him or furnish a link in the chain of evidence necessary to
constitute a violation of the misprision statute." It would similarly
seem that a suspect in custody could invoke his right to remain silent
when being questioned by the FBI or other investigating authorities.
Any false statements he might make pursuant to such questioning
arguably could not be admitted against him to show concealment in his
misprision trial if he were not given appropriate Miranda warnings."'
138 402 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1968). Accord, United States v. Pigott, 453 F.2d
419 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Graham, 487 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D: Ky. 1980).
'- 432 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1970) cert. dismissed sub. nom., Montagna v.
United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
1,0 United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1976).
". United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650, 653 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979). Self in-
crimination, in a proper factual setting, is also a defense to a misprision indict-
ment in England. Rex v. King, [1965] 1 All E.R. 1053.
' , See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
1,3 See United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1979).
'" United States v. Chandler, 380 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.
Trigilio, 225 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958); Grudin v. United States, 198 F.2d 610 (9th
Cir. 1952).
'" See Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358 (1980); United States v. Pitt-
man, 527 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8
(9th Cir. 1970).
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The fifth amendment protection may explain why no individual has
been indicted for a substantive felony and also for misprision of that
felony. If the grand jury thinks it sufficiently clear that a person has
committed the substantive felony to issue an indictment, then surely
the defendant has cause to believe that his making the felony known to
civil authorities would tend to incriminate him. The logic of this position
leads to the rather startling conclusion that the individuals who actually
engaged in fixing corporate prices with their competitors may be able to
destroy corporate records evidencing this violation with impunity. They
cannot be prosecuted for misprision because of the fifth amendment,
and their acts of concealment, since concealment is not in itself a
crime,"' would therefore go unpunished. Query, however, whether the
corporation could be indicted for misprision in such a case, if other cor-
porate agents knew of the antitrust felony, but were not involved in the
price fixing activities and so were able to report it on behalf of the cor-
poration. "
By far the most interesting question which arises when misprision is
considered in the antitrust context is whether the fifth amendment
cases will be held applicable when the attorney-client privilege' 8 is
substituted for the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
That is, can an attorney, after being told the incriminating facts of a
past antitrust violation by his client, then destroy documentary
evidence with impunity because the attorney-client privilege relieves
him (indeed, precludes him".9 ) from disclosing the felony, the facts of
which his client disclosed to him in confidence for the purpose of receiv-
ing legal advice? Is this attorney, himself, then protected from prosecu-
tion?
Preliminarily, it should be noted that England, a common law jurisdic-
tion, appears to accept the attorney-client privilege as a defense to a
misprision indictment.5 ' Ohio, by statute, has provided that knowing
failure to report information that a felony has been committed is excused
if the "information is privileged by reason of the relationship between
attorney and client."'' In both England and Ohio, however, failure to
I" Concealment of a crime, as by destroying evidence, is not a violation of the
accessory after the fact statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3. That statute requires harboring or
otherwise giving aid to the felon personally. See note 22, supra. In any event, one
could hardly be an accessory after the fact to his own crime.
" This assumes that a corporation can be guilty of misprision of its own price
fixing felony, which may not be the case. See text accompanying notes 38-41
supra.
"4 FED. R. EVID. 501.
"A lawyer is legally obliged not to divulge information confidentially
revealed to him by his client regarding a committed felony." Goldberg, Mispri-
sion of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context, 52 A.B.A.J. 148, 150 (1966).
150 Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecution, [1962] A.C. 528, 564.
"'. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(E)(1) (Page 1978).
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report constitutes the crime; there is no further requirement of conceal-
ment.152 When the crime is passive non-disclosure only, relieving from
criminality an attorney who protects his client's confidences seems
reasonable. The question under federal law, however, is whether he is
also protected if he actively destroys documentary evidence, thus mak-
ing it more difficult for a grand jury to uncover the antitrust felony.
While the argument is syllogistically seductive, reliance on it does not
seem advisable. A court could easily object that it makes a sword rather
than a shield out of the attorney-client privilege. It might hold that
disclosure to the attorney, followed by his destruction of evidence,
shows that the disclosure was not made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice. Even though concealment alone is not a crime, 1 ' a court
might nevertheless apply the principle that the privilege does not pro-
tect non-disclosure of future wrongdoing.1" ' There is a flexibility in the
common law not present in constitutional imperatives. Most important-
ly, the argument gives the attorney rights which go well beyond the
necessity of the legal relationship; clients with criminal legal problems
will hardly cease retaining attorneys because of the attorneys' legal in-
ability to conceal (ie., destroy) facts evidencing the clients' crimes.
The question which logically follows is whether an attorney may ad-
vise his client to destroy evidence, if by doing so his client would com-
mit misprision of antitrust felony. Would the attorney then be guilty of
misprision? Such a course is hardly to be recommended, for advising
commission of a felony is obviously unethical,1 5 5 would subject the at-
torney to discipline, and would not be a privileged communication.1"
Nevertheless, it may not be an act of concealment required to trigger
the statute. In Neal v. United States,57 the court dealt with the advice
as follows:
The government argues that for a few days after December
27, 1937, the defendant aided in concealing John L. Neal, and
that he is therefore guilty of misprision of felony. The evidence
shows that he did know where John was in hiding and may have
advised with him about escaping; but failure to inform the of-
ficers is not sufficient alone to constitute a crime under the
statute.'"
15 Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecution, [1962] A.C. 528, 562-63; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (Page 1978).
15 See note 146 supra.
"' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR4-101(C)(3).
5 Id. DR7-102(A)(7).
'5 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 95 (2d ed. 1972).
157 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), conviction as an accessory after the fact affd
following retrial, 114 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 676 (1941).
15 Id. at 650.
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In spite of this, it would not seem wholly fanciful to suggest that the at-
torney nevertheless could be guilty of misprision on an aider and abet-
tor theory under 18 U.S.C. § 2 or that the client and the attorney could
theoretically be indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to commit
misprision.
Suppose, however, that the individual client was the principal price
fixer and could not be successfully prosecuted for misprision because of
the fifth amendment.' 9 In such a case the attorney, in advising his client
to destroy evidence, would not be advising his client to commit a crime
and thus the attorney could not, himself, be guilty of aiding and abet-
ting, or conspiracy to commit, a non-existent crime. The line the at-
torney would be walking is very narrow but, analytically, it is there.
I. "shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both."
The punishment provided makes misprision of felony itself a felony
under 18 U.S.C. § 1160 and, theoretically at least, it would seem possible
for there to be misprision of the felony of misprision, that is to say,
there could be a cover-up of a cover-up.
The cases make it clear that misprision is a separate offense from the
underlying felony which was concealed and not reported."6 ' It has been
held also that the felony of misprision of felony is separate from the
crime of being an accessory after the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 3.162 This
holding has at least two implications: first, a defendant could be tried
for both misprision and accessory after the fact, convicted of both, and
sentenced consecutively on each; and second, reasonable fear of prosecu-
tion on one or the other would justify assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege when being questioned on either. When a conviction on a count
other than misprision is valid and the sentence given on that count is at
least as long as the sentence given on conviction of the misprision count,
1 See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
160 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
161 E.g., Castaneda de Esper v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 557
F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that misprision of the felony of conspiring to
possess heroin was not a conviction of a crime "relating to" drugs which would
justify her deportation).
1 6 See United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1129 (7th Cir. 1970) cert. dis-
missed sub nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
905 (1971) (holding that consecutive sentences could be given for convictions
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4). Daddano was followed in United States v. Dye, 508
F.2d 1226, 1237 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975) (holding that an
indictment containing both misprision and accessory after the fact counts was not
"duplicitous"). Language approving of both Daddano and Dye appears in
Castaneda de Esper v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 557 F.2d at 83.
See also United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Gonzalez, 582 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1978).
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and when such sentences are to run concurrently, a court is entitled to
refuse to pass on the validity of the misprision conviction." 3
V. MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several procedural points merit attention. First, at least two cases
have held that a misprision of felony indictment can be returned in the
words of the statute, with the defendant being relegated to a bill of par-
ticulars to obtain a statement of the precise charges against him.' Sec-
ond, the protections of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure are fully applicable to bargained pleas of guilty to a misprision of
felony count, and if this rule is not followed, it will result in a reversal of
a conviction for misprision of felony.165 Third, when the government has
been guilty of excessive and prejudicial pre-indictment and post-
indictment delay, resulting in loss of a relevant witness to the underly-
ing felony, defendant is entitled to dismissal of the misprision indict-
ment since proof of the actual commission, vel non, of the underlying
felony, would be a necessary element of the proof in the misprision
trial. '6
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Reaching conclusions from the preceding material is difficult. The
potential reach of the statute seems much greater than its current ap-
plication by the Antitrust Division. Indeed, it has never been used in an
antitrust context. 7 Moreover, each fact situation will have its own set
of imperatives and nuances; formulating sound advice of general ap-
plicability is therefore all but impossible.
Nevertheless, a few observations can be advanced. First, and by far
the most important, the attorney should make certain that the antitrust
' Consenza v. United States, 195 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir. 1952).
's Sullivan v. United States, 411 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 284 F.
Supp. 579 (N.D. Okla. 1968), followed in United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119,
1124 (7th Cir. 1970) cert. dismissed sub nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S.
967, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
165 United States v. Clark, 574 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225, 1226 (5th Cir. 1977).
'" United States v. Heckler, 428 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
167 The Justice Department is moving, however, toward the use of misprision
indictments in the so-called "white collar crime" area. See United States v.
Wilkins, United States v. Regan and United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 3-80-14-G
(N.D. Tex. Dallas Div., May 28, 1980) (indictments), superseding United States v.
Smith, et al., Cr. No. 3-80-14 (N.D. Tex. Dallas Div., February 5, 1980)
(indictment). Smith and Regan were indicted for misprision of Wilkin's income
tax evasion felony and Wilkins was indicted for misprision of Regan's income tax
evasion felony. When the original indictment is compared with the superseding
indictments, however, it is reasonably clear that the misprision counts in the
superseding indictments were the result of plea bargaining.
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laws are currently being complied with. Such an action constitutes good
corporate governance and is socially desirable. It also helps reduce
liability in light of the inexorable running of the statute of limitations.
As an essential predicate to developing the best possible relations with
the government on behalf of one's client, as soon as the attorney has
even a hint that there is a problem, he should advise the client to
remedy it. Promptly getting the client back into antitrust compliance
may well be the single most important factor which will bear on the
government's discretionary decision to bring a misprision indictment.
If the attorney suspects that evidence of an antitrust violation lurks
in his client's records and his client has been negligent in administering
its record retention program or remiss in setting one up, then such ac-
tivities should be considered before conducting a factual investigation.
If full knowledge is first acquired, and that knowledge is of the actual
commission of an antitrust felony, subsequent destruction of harmful
documents will present a concealment issue.
Even if full knowledge is obtained however, not stopping the routine
implementation of a pre-existing record retention program could be
thought to present no more than an acceptable level of risk, for it could
be argued that there is no concealment until there is a departure from a
pre-existing procedure. Obviously, setting up a record retention pro-
gram after full knowledge is acquired presents the greatest concern. If
that course is nevertheless decided upon, then it may be desirable to
use an outside consultant who is not necessarily advised of the existence
of a problem,' 8 for implementation of his professional recommendations
should be useful on negating a claim that destruction was for the pur-
pose of concealment.
It is tempting to argue that the board of the corporation should be
kept uninformed, for if it has no knowledge, then its members are im-
mune from misprision indictment. This argument is seriously flawed. It
is the board that runs the corporation. Indeed, in some senses the board
is the corporation. While insulating against a misprision indictment is
desirable, the duty to auditors"6 9 and the SEC, 7 ' the necessity of im-
plementing an effective antitrust compliance program 7 ' and the decision
I" Such consultants can be located through directories such as CONSULTANTS
AND CONSULTING ORGANIZATIONS DIRECTORY, and NEW CONSULTANTS, 1979 SuP-
PLEMENT (Gale Research Co., Detroit MI); DIRECTORY OF MANAGEMENT CON-
SULTANTS (Consultant News, Fitzwilliam, NH) and DIRECTORY OF MEMBERSHIP
AND SERVICE (Association of Consulting Management Engineers, N.Y., NY).
169 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
170 See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
'"" See generally, National Institute on Preventive Antitrust, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1 (1979); especially Scher, Antitrust Compliance Documents, id. at 437;-
Greenberg, Antitrust Compliance Procedures, id. at 453. See also Record, vol.
110, at 245-46, United States v. International Paper Co., Cr. No. H-76-11 (S.D.
Tex., Apr. 26, 1979) (jury charged that it could consider a diligently enforced com-
pliance program on the question of intent).
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whether to invoke the Division's Voluntary Disclosure program'72 are
considerably more important. It is the board which often will have the
responsibility for making such corporate decisions.'" The misprision
statute is only one factor, and while care should be taken to avoid its
violation, there are more significant questions to consider when a clear
antitrust felony has been uncovered.
Prompt use of the Voluntary Disclosure program has an interesting
impact on the question of document destruction. If it is correct that the
Division will permit board review of the implications of discovery of an
antitrust felony before the duty to disclose begins, 7' then it may be that
disclosure to the Division promptly after such review would preclude
finding a misprision violation since disclosure was made "as soon as
possible" after the corporation (meaning its board) had knowledge of it.
If this is correct, concealment by way of wholesale document destruc-
tion would not be unlawful, for the misprision statute would otherwise
be inapplicable. 7 5
Generalizing from the misprision cases is difficult, but it is possible to
suggest that they represent four distinct threads. First, the affirmative
acts constituting misprision may be genuinely antisocial acts. Law en-
forcement officials have a legitimate concern when an agreement is
reached to kill anyone who fails a lie detector test designed to ferret out
informers."' Second, misprision seems to be used as a sort of lesser-
included offense designed to secure the offender's cooperation in pros-
ecuting the principal felons while not letting the offender off without
any criminal sanctions.7 ' Third, the statute appears to be used when the
authorities feel that the offender was guilty along with the principal
felons but proof of such guilt is lacking. Finally, the statute may be used
when the authorities genuinely feel that the offender was obstructing
17 See note 15 supra.
173 If the violation involved only a minor product line of a sizeable corporation,
perhaps these decisions could be made at a lower level. The point is that risks
under the misprision statute are probably an inadequate reason for not making
appropriate disclosure to whatever decisional level of the corporation would
otherwise be appropriate.
'.. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
"' The evidentiary inferences which arise from ad hoc destruction of evidence
should always be carefully evaluated before any such course is decided upon.
Compare A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 314 F.2d 839, 841 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963) and Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
380 F. Supp. 819, 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) with Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n.,
514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975).
171 United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed sub.
nom., Montagna v. United States, 401 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
"' E.g., United States v. Davis, 597 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Lamont, 565 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1977).
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justice but cannot rely upon 18 U.S.C. § 1503 because justice was
technically not being administered.
Consideration of these generalizations with respect to document
destruction in the antitrust context may be useful. Document destruc-
tion is, intrinsically, a neutral act. No one's property or person is put in
jeopardy by placing documents in a wastepaper basket. Misprision does
not serve the purpose of a lesser-included offense, for it carries the
same three year prison term as does a direct violation of the Sherman
Act. A situation in which the Division believes that an individual was
engaged in price fixing but cannot prove it and therefore searches for a
possible misprision indictment, instead, seems unlikely in the extreme.
Only in the fourth circumstance-when the Division genuinely feels that
the concealment has obstructed its efforts to uncover the crime-does it
seem likely that the Division would want to indict. But query whether it
would have that feeling unless an investigation were underway and a
subpoena or Civil Investigative Demand, or at least a letter inquiry,
were outstanding? In such circumstances, however, the perjury,"' false
statement " 9 and obstruction statutes,'80 and criminal contempt'8' may of-
fer more inviting weapons. One should also be aware that the antitrust
violation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial for
misprision of an antitrust felony,'82 and that a culpable intent must be
shown in proving the antitrust felony.'8'
-'- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1976). See note 20 supra. See also United States v.
Reeves, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079, at
53,762-63 (E.D. Mo. 1979); United States v. Scrimgeour, [1970-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079, at 53,752 (S.D. Fla. 1979); United States
v. Tobey, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078, at 53,728
(E.D. Ill. 1978); United States v. Hughes, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,077, at 53,712 (S.D. Fla. 1977); United States v. Hopwood,
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075, at 53,605 (C.D. Cal.
1975); United States v. Swartz [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,075, at 53,615 (M.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Usden, [1970-1979
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,074, at 53,572 (D. N.J. 1974); United
States v. King, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,073, at
53,553 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
"9 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See note 21 supra. See also United States v.
Markham, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074, at 53,594
(E.D. Va. 1975).
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505 (1976). See note 19 supra. See also United States v.
Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978); United States v. Turen, [1970-1979
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,074, at 53,572 (D. N.J. 1974).
'8' 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (1976). See note 24 supra. See also United States v.
White, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078, at 53,724
(D.D.C. 1978); United States v. National Gypsum Co., 1972 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
74,173 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
,82 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
' United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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In addition, there is some ambivalence in our society as to the extent
to which disclosure of the crimes of others is a high social goal. While
Mr. Justice Powell has said that "gross indifference to the duty to
report known criminal behavior remains a badge of irresponsible
citizenship,"18 ' Mr. Justice Marshall has answered that, if this is so, then
it is "hard to understand how terms such as 'stoolpigeon,' 'snitch,'
'squealer,' and 'tattletale' have come to be the common description of
those who engage in such" reporting.'85 Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to pro-
claim every offence which comes to his knowledge; but the law which
would punish him in every case for not performing his duty is too harsh
for man."1 8
The answer to this line of social inquiry, apart from its legal ir-
relevance, may be that misprision involves concealment as well as non-
disclosure, although, as stated, document destruction, intrinsically, is a
rather benign form of concealment.
All of the above leads to the reasoned speculation that the Division
will probably continue to be chary about invoking the misprision
statute. In most circumstances where it might apply, the Division has
other and better weapons at its disposal. If a case arose where knowing
nondisclosure and concealment were used to facilitate a continuation of
the violation, then a misprision indictment would be swift and certain.
If, however, the corporation promptly acted to terminate the violation
and to implement an antitrust compliance program, it seems fair to sug-
gest that the Division would be reluctant to utilize misprision unless the
concealment were particulary flagrant or blatant. The conclusion would
seem to be that, if destruction of documentary evidence of an antitrust
felony has been decided upon, it should be done only where there is at
least a colorable and presentable reason for it which would negate the
intent requirement inherent in the active verb "conceals."'87 If no such
reason exists, the documents should probably be quietly stored in the
company vault until the day an impersonal record retention program
takes them to their grave.'88
"" Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358 (1980).
Id. at 1369.
18 Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575 (1822).
187 See Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961). ". . . [A]lmost everything is
evidence of something, but that does not mean that nothing can ever safely be
destroyed." Id. at 242.
'" United States v. Sampol, No. 79-1541 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 15, 1980) was not
reported at the time this article was printed. It holds that trying a misprision of-
fense with courts alleging murder of foreign officials is prejudicial error; that ly-
ing to an FBI agent and making false statements to a grand jury are both acts of
concealment; and that consecutive sentences on the false statement count and the
imprision count violates the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy.
19791
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/3
